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Abstract 
Humans are an ecologically extremely successful species. Underlying this achievement 
is our evolved unique adaptation for culture. Moreover, humans’ cultural capacity 
initiated a process of gene-culture coevolution that lead to a plethora of behavioral and 
cognitive dispositions on which cultural adaptation to challenging environments via 
cultural evolution rests. These characteristics of human cognition are highly relevant to 
any discipline dealing with human behavior. This article presents these outcomes of 
human phylogeny and discusses this naturalistic perspective’s implications for 
(evolutionary) economics. Moreover, some fruitful applications of cultural evolution 
theory to the explanation of economic phenomena are provided. 
Keywords 
Economic theory development – Cultural evolution theory – Learning mechanisms – 
Human behavior in economic contexts 
JEL Classifications 
B41, D00, B52, A12 
#1901 Bremen Papers on Economics & Innovation 
The Promises of a Naturalistic Approach: 
How Cultural Evolution Theory Can 
Inform (Evolutionary) Economics 
 
Christian Cordes* 
 
2/29 
 
#1901 Bremen Papers on Economics & Innovation 
 
The Promises of a Naturalistic Approach:  
How Cultural Evolution Theory Can  
Inform (Evolutionary) Economics 
“… a theory of behavior and cognition 
suitable for evolutionary economics 
needs to recognize the evolving 
cultural context of economic behavior 
and cognition.” 
Richard R. Nelson (2016, p. 737) 
 
1. Introduction 
Humans are an ecologically extremely successful species. We have been 
capable of living and thriving in a broad range of habitats around the globe. Inuits, to 
give an example, have created a vast body of cultural know-how about how to survive 
and adapt in the Artic – an ecologically very challenging habitat. For instance, to hunt a 
seal in this environment, they know how to find their well-hidden breathing holes in the 
ice (example drawn from Henrich, 2016, ch. 3). The area around it must be covered by 
snow since otherwise the animals will detect hunters approaching. Next, Inuit hunters 
skillfully open the hole, smell it to verify that it is still in use, and assess the shape of 
the hole with a special piece of caribou antler to ascertain the precise location and 
dimensions of the breathing hole beneath the ice without otherwise disturbing it. This is 
important to know where to thrust the harpoon later. They then cover the hole with 
snow again leaving a small gap at the top that is capped with a specifically constructed 
down indicator. If the seal enters its breathing hole, the indicator moves, and the hunter 
must be capable of blindly throwing the harpoon into the hole using all his weight. The 
harpoon must have a particular length, a detachable tip tethered with a strong braid of 
sinew line, and a rear spike made of extra-hard polar bear bone. What is more, Inuits 
know how to cook a hunted seal (before the meat goes off) by starting a fire (in the 
Artic!) in a lamp made from soapstone, burning oil from seal blubber and using a wick 
out of a particular species of moss. 
Our species’ remarkable ecological success that exemplarily shows up in the 
Inuit case calls for an identification of its behavioral and cognitive underpinnings. An 
answer to this question is highly relevant to any discipline dealing with human behavior 
– including economics – for we would expect it to reveal basic features of our cognition. 
So, is our outstanding adaptive performance arising from a far superior – as compared 
to other primates – form of well-informed individual decision-making that draws on a 
powerful general-purpose brain structure as economists may argue? Are individuals in 
this process really aware of all options open to them for preference-satisfaction to then 
pick the inter-temporary utility-maximizing variant out of this set? Is that the way we 
deal with the world’s complexity? In fact, the scientifically sound answer to this question 
is that the successful human cultural adaptation to various challenging environments 
depends predominantly upon our unique pro-sociality: it is collective culture that 
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enables the accumulation of skills, knowledge, and patterns of behavior far more 
complex than any individual could invent in her lifetime (see Henrich and McElreath, 
2003; Caldwell and Millen, 2008; Henrich, 2016).1 
Human cultural adaptation, therefore, is enabled by learned behavior developed 
over years with investment and exchange from other individuals (McElreath, 2016). 
Culturally transmitted information accumulates over generations, such that knowledge 
gets refined and more and more complex – the so-called “ratchet effect” that not only 
underlies Inuit hunting strategies but also modern technology and institutional 
arrangements (e.g., Herrmann et al., 2007). These phenomena’s knowledge bases are 
created by group members’, organizations’, and professional peers’ lengthy cultural 
learning processes and are acquired by individuals only as they are part of this 
broader, communicating community (see Nelson, 2016). At the root of our adaptive 
success lies our capacity for culture based on unique features of social cognition (see 
Tomasello, 1999b). Hence, cultural – including economic – evolution rests on and is 
constrained by foundations laid before by natural selection in the course of human 
phylogeny (see Witt, 1999; Cordes, 2006, 2015; Gowdy, 2008). Evolved cognitive 
devices and dispositions as well as wants and learning mechanisms define the 
cognitive and physiological basis on which cultural evolution is predicated. Below, we 
show how gene-culture coevolution (GCC) explains many crucial aspects of these 
cognitive foundations, including an unmatched degree of prosociality and cooperation, 
cultural learning skills, and biases in cultural transmission. 
Our perspective contrasts sharply with the idea that human agents primarily 
arrive at their behavioral options by doing perfectly informed isolated utility-maximizing 
calculations. While standard economic theory can account for phenomena such as 
other-regarding preferences, cooperation, or affective states of agents, it does so in an 
ad hoc manner by just adding further parameters to the utility function and thus to the 
process of rational decision-making. It is, however, silent about some much deeper 
influences of culture on human behavior and choice: preference systems are a result of 
cultural transmission forces (e.g., through socialization) and subject to continuous 
change via cultural learning (see Section 4). Preferences are culturally generated. 
What is more, also causal beliefs about possible outcomes of behavior – as another 
crucial ingredient of rational decision-making – are emanating from cultural learning 
and are acquired “pre-rationally” (also Collier, 2016). As to humans’ prosocial 
dispositions and their affective underpinnings, the recognition of cultural evolution in 
combination with genetic inheritance (gene-culture coevolution, see below) provides 
sound explanations of their evolutionary origins and exact behavioral effects. Thereby, 
                                               
 
1 Culture is considered to be all of the information that individuals acquire from others 
by a variety of social learning processes including teaching and imitation (see Boyd 
and Richerson, 1985). 
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it substantiates these ingredients to a more encompassing behavioral model by 
drawing on interdisciplinary scientific evidence (see Section 2). This also holds for 
psychological characteristics that potentially lead to non-utility maximizing, non-rational 
behaviors, such as a norm following psychology or various biases in cultural learning 
that may make us adopt maladaptive cultural traits (for details, again see below). 
As shown in this article and supported by, among others, anthropological 
evidence, rational decision-making is not the core feature of humans’ immense 
ecological success and its cognitive foundations. Rather, it is culture including social 
interaction and various learning mechanisms that is the defining feature of humankind 
(see Brewer et al., 2017) – much more than it is the case with rational choice-based 
behaviors. This insight, which directly follows from facts delivered by, for example, 
cognitive sciences, evolutionary biology, neurosciences, anthropology, and 
evolutionary psychology, should affect the way we do economics. In this article, we 
therefore call for a naturalistic approach to economics that does justice to Homo 
sapiens and this agent’s evolved cognitive and behavioral traits and that contributes to 
more realistic models of human behavior in economic contexts. We also indicate the 
potential of an application of these insights to economic theory building including formal 
models of cultural evolution. 
The article is organized as follows. In Section 2, we discuss the fundamental 
human adaptation for culture and how GCC has subsequently led to further unique 
biological, social, and behavioral dispositions in the case of humans. Next, Section 3 
describes cultural learning mechanisms and various systematic biases in cultural 
transmission that can also be incorporated into formal models of cultural evolution. 
Section 4 presents some promising applications of naturalistic thinking and models of 
cultural evolution to (evolutionary) economics. Finally, Section 5 concludes. 
2. Who we are: humans as cultural beings and the results 
of gene-culture coevolution 
As a cultural species, we are able to attentively observe and learn from other 
people by inferring our models’ underlying intentions, motivations, beliefs, strategies, 
and preferences. This skill also enables us to engage in effective instructive teaching, 
the flip side of cultural learning. According to Tomasello et al. (2005; also Tomasello, 
1999a; Tomasello and Rakoczy, 2003; Herrmann et al., 2007), the crucial human 
adaptation for culture that prepared the cognitive stage for these capabilities is our 
capacity to understand others as intentional beings like the self (also Cordes, 2004). 
This perspective-taking competence made possible a differentiation between intentions 
and behavioral means employed by role models to achieve certain goals. Thus, putting 
oneself into the shoes of others is a prerequisite for our extraordinarily powerful cultural 
learning mechanisms. Cultural evolution is then a consequence of genetically evolved 
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psychological adaptations for learning from other people. As shown below, further 
refinement processes of these dispositions due to recursive gene-culture interactions 
made us ever more powerful social learners in the course of human evolution. What is 
more, while instances of frugal cultural learning are frequent in non-human nature, it is 
only humans who realize a “ratchet effect” in cultural evolution giving rise to cumulative 
cultural development and adaptation.2 
As a kind of side effect, this capacity for culture gave rise to very idiosyncratic 
human behaviors: it constitutes the basis for empathy, i.e., the understanding of 
affective states of others by vicariously taking their position (e.g., Singer and Fehr, 
2005; Bernhardt and Singer, 2012). Moreover, our mind-reading skills also facilitate the 
development of sophisticated “theories of mind”, another distinctively human 
competence (Herrmann et al., 2007). Others’ emotions, therefore, shape our own 
motives toward them and deliver the motivational underpinnings of many seemingly 
“irrational” behaviors, such as helping behavior or the preference for particular social 
norms of fairness (e.g., the “golden rule”, see Cordes and Schubert, 2007). Hence, 
other-regarding sociocognitive features of humans enable both, the cultural “ratchet 
effect” and prosocial, altruistic acts, which do not necessarily accord with assumptions 
of individual, selfish utility maximization – a first important deviation from the standard 
model of economic behavior. 
Once cultural adaptation became the cornerstone of our species’ success about 
two million years ago, the main selection pressure on genes led to improving our 
psychological skills to acquire, store, process, and organize the cultural knowledge 
increasingly available in our social environment (see Richerson and Boyd, 2005; 
Mesoudi et al., 2006; Henrich, 2016).3 Subsequently, more sophisticated learning 
capacities facilitated more complex cultural adaptations that then again called for even 
better learning skills. In this context, less skilled cultural learners would have been at a 
strong selective disadvantage (social and natural) vis-à-vis competing learners in a 
group because they would not have acquired the same repertoire of behaviors, norms, 
skills, and know-how. Hence, enhanced cultural learning abilities gave rise to a close 
interaction between an accumulating body of cultural knowledge and genetic evolution, 
a process that has shaped our cognitive setup in very particular ways. This 
coevolutionary process between genes and culture – gene-culture coevolution (GCC) – 
                                               
 
2 Dean et al. (2012) demonstrate how sociocognitive processes of imitation, instruction, 
and prosociality, which are only observed in humans but not in other primates, enable 
cumulative cultural evolution. 
3 For a review of theories of cultural evolution including criticisms and controversies, 
see Mesoudi (2016). This article also discusses some open questions in the field of 
GCC. 
6/29 
 
#1901 Bremen Papers on Economics & Innovation 
 
The Promises of a Naturalistic Approach:  
How Cultural Evolution Theory Can  
Inform (Evolutionary) Economics 
created many important features of the psyche of modern humans also relevant in 
contemporary behavior in economic contexts.4 Below, in Section 3, we discuss several 
cognitive dispositions, especially manifold learning biases in cultural transmission, 
which resulted from GCC in the past, while Section 4 applies these insights to 
economic theorizing. 
In combination with cultural group selection, GCC also explains the phylogenetic 
origins of further uniquely human inclinations toward non-selfish, prosocial behaviors. 
Examples are cooperation in groups (including non-kins) and altruistic punishment of 
deviators, behavioral traits that are irrational from the point of view of fitness- or utility-
maximizing individuals, but welfare-enhancing at the group-level (Soltis et al., 1995; 
Boyd and Richerson, 2002; Richerson and Boyd, 2005; Sober and Wilson, 1998). 
Groups with prosocial norms had an advantage over other, competing groups in 
cultural group selection. The cultural environments in these relatively more successful 
groups favored agents exhibiting prosocial behaviors including cooperation and 
altruistic punishment. As a consequence, phenotypes with genetic dispositions for such 
behaviors fitting well into these group cultures do better than others and disseminate. 
In line with this idea, evidence from the neurosciences shows that there is an evolved 
neurological foundation on which some of these prosocial behaviors rest (see Fehr and 
Gächter, 2002; Rilling et al., 2002; Reuter et al., 2011). They are rewarded by specific 
dopamine-releasing brain structures. These neuronal dispositions are at odds with a 
behavioral model merely putting individual utility-maximizing center stage. Moreover, 
Tomasello (2009, p. 43) suggests the strong emotional reactions of “shame” and “guilt” 
as good examples of outcomes of the coevolutionary process between biology and 
humans’ specific cultural environments, namely groups that reward or sanction certain 
behaviors (also Durham, 1991). One can hardly argue that these affective motivational 
underpinnings of human behavior always lead to rational, individual welfare-enhancing 
behaviors, although originally these have been adaptive as to living and acting in 
certain cultural group contexts. 
Norm psychology is another important feature of human cognition evolved by 
means of GCC (see McElreath et al., 2003; Chudek and Henrich, 2010; Henrich, 2016, 
ch. 11). It has been caused at the genetic level by the enforcement of social norms in 
group culture contexts. Phenotypes endowed with a propensity to obey norms enjoyed 
a relative advantage in these settings. This psychological disposition was of great 
adaptive value for it enabled the stabilization and maintenance of cooperation and 
other prosocial norms at the group level. However, due to this cognitive disposition, 
                                               
 
4 Other important products of GCC are anatomical changes of hands, shoulders, and 
elbows due to increasingly complex weapons and tools, changes in throat anatomy and 
brain structures because of language, and extended childhood and adolescence to 
take advantage of cultural knowledge (Henrich, 2016, ch. 5). 
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cultural evolution can also produce social norms that tend to be stable even if they 
neither serve the group nor the individual. Norm psychology can also support 
maladaptive traits by inducing the following of norms for their own sake (also Durham, 
1991). This may even be against an agent’s self-interest. Moreover, culture often 
comprises – causally opaque – adaptive repertoires accumulated over generations that 
are not understood by individuals. For this reason, complex cultural adaptations and 
GCC have favored individuals who frequently rely on pure faith in cultural transmission 
rather than on applying causal models, personal experiences, or rational thinking (see 
Henrich, 2016, ch. 7). Again, we observe seemingly irrational human cognitive traits 
that only make (adaptive) sense when seen through a cultural evolution lens. 
Detailed evidence on the concrete outcomes of GCC is amassing (see 
Herrmann et al., 2007; Henrich, 2016). Rapid progress in molecular genetics and 
genomics provides data to produce rich empirical support for GCC (e.g., Ross and 
Richerson, 2014). Chiao and Blizinsky (2010), to give a detailed account, describe the 
intriguing GCC between cultural values of individualism-collectivism and allelic 
frequency of the serotonin transporter functional polymorphism. Geographical regions, 
they show, characterized by cultural collectivism exhibit a greater prevalence of S allele 
carriers of this polymorphism, which is associated with increased negative emotions, 
depression, attentional bias to negative information, and fear conditioning. Their 
argument is that collectivistic cultural norms have evolved to serve as an adaptive, 
“anti-psychopathology” function, creating an environmental niche that reduces 
exposure to, for example, chronic life stress or affective disorders for genetically 
susceptible group members. Mediation analyses indicate that increased frequency of S 
allele carriers predicts decreased anxiety and mood disorder prevalence owing to 
increased collectivistic cultural values. This leads to genetic selection of the S allele 
within collectivistic cultures. Indeed, evidence shows that historical prevalence of the S 
allele predicts cultural variability in individualism-collectivism. Since this genetic 
disposition also gives rise to affective attentional biases, it influences information 
processing mechanisms and the storage and transmission of cultural values by 
favoring, for example, collectivistic cultural norms of conformity and interdependence. 
Genes and cultures interact, therefore, in both directions. On the other hand, carriers of 
the L allele of this gene exhibit positive cognitive bias to individualistic thinking, such as 
self-expression and autonomy.5 
                                               
 
5 The cultural dimensions of “individualism” and “collectivism” have repeatedly been 
shown to be of great importance when it comes to explaining economic phenomena, 
such as economic performance of societies (Greif, 1994), economic growth and 
innovative activity (Gorodnichenko and Roland, 2011), or organizational development 
(Cordes et al., 2017). 
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As shown in this Section, starting from our unique social-cognitive adaptation for 
culture, GCC led to the further selection for phenotypes that could use cultural 
information available in their social environments. Improved cultural learning skills 
would have permitted a greater accumulation of cultural know-how and further driven 
genetic evolution to increase cultural learning abilities. Cultural evolution initiated a 
process that drove, partly in combination with cultural group selection forces, genetic 
evolution to make us powerful social learners, prosocial group members, and 
cooperative, docile rule followers. These capacities and traits represent the very 
essence of our specific cognitive setup and our unmatched ecological success. For any 
scientific discipline dedicated to explaining real-world human behavior, these findings 
provide a very rich source of naturalistic insights on our nature that can and should 
inform theory development and empirical work. 
3. What we need: models of cultural evolution 
incorporating cultural learning mechanisms 
As shown above, evolutionary theory explains the origins of cultural evolution in 
human phylogeny and its interactions with genetic evolution (GCC). It also fosters the 
understanding of the lasting influence of evolved cognitive devices that participate in 
generating human behavior. Moreover, GCC drove the emergence of specialized 
cognitive abilities including cultural learning biases that guide the tapping of cultural 
knowledge in an individual’s social environment. These cause people to acquire some 
cultural traits rather than others. By selectively attending to certain types of cultural 
content, individuals most effectively acquire valuable cultural knowledge. These 
biologically evolved foundations of learning and reasoning enable cumulative cultural 
evolution and also directly facilitate and affect economic evolution as part of this all-
encompassing process (see Witt, 2003, p. 15f; Cordes, 2015). Thus, if we want to deal 
with cultural beings when doing economics, rational choice models based on individual 
decision-making are not going to do the whole job. Instead, we need to apply cultural 
evolution theory including its formal tools to grasp important facets of human behavior 
in economic contexts. 
Models of cultural evolution allow one to deduce the group-level consequences 
of individual-level psychologies, decision rules, and behaviors (e.g., Henrich and Boyd, 
2002; McElreath and Boyd, 2007; van den Bergh and Gowdy, 2009; Hoppitt and 
Laland, 2013; also Rice, 2004). Many of these models involve deriving recursion 
equations in discrete or continuous time that allow us to predict the frequency of a 
certain cultural trait in a population in the next stage of the cultural evolutionary process 
given its frequency in the present stage (see, as points of origin, Cavalli-Sforza and 
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Feldman, 1981; Boyd and Richerson, 1985).6 Cultural learning processes may also be 
captured by, for example, models of sexual selection stemming from population 
genetics (e.g., Boyd and Richerson, 1985; Schubert and Cordes, 2013), replicator 
dynamics (e.g., Metcalfe, 1988; Henrich, 2001), evolutionary game theory (e.g., 
McElreath and Boyd, 2007), or Price equation-based approaches (e.g., Beheim and 
Baldini, 2012; Klarl et al., 2018). Moreover, drawing on earlier work in cultural evolution 
theory (see Feldman and Cavalli-Sforza, 1975), Cordes et al. (2017) introduce another 
modeling technique: they depict group-bound learning and socialization drawing on 
cultural transmission matrices within a Markovian formal framework. Thus, formal tools 
of cultural evolution theory offer a plethora of fruitful ways to analyze evolving cultures 
and behaviors of human agents as cultural beings. Furthermore, these rigorous, 
quantitative forms of analysis are open to empirical testing. We will discuss some of 
these contributions at greater detail in the next section. 
All these models of cultural evolution describe the changing frequencies and 
values of cultural traits in populations of interacting agents due to cultural transmission 
mechanisms including general, for example, group-bound, learning forces and 
particular learning biases (also Norenzayan and Heine, 2005; Mesoudi and O'Brian, 
2008; Hoppitt and Laland, 2013). Because of these biases, humans do not arbitrarily 
copy cultural traits exhibited within their social environments. Instead, evolved and/or 
learned cognitive biases take effect in cultural transmission by affecting the probability 
of adopting certain kinds of cultural traits and corresponding behaviors.7 These biases 
are a way how real-world human beings tap the rich cultural knowledge available to 
them and heuristically cope with the great amount of choice options and behaviors 
open to them. They guide attention and economize on scarce cognitive resources. 
Moreover, many of these learning biases are outcomes of GCC that has led to the 
evolution of phenotypes capable of effectively using cultural information (see above). 
As to the biases that may be included in these formal models, the conformity 
bias is a prominent one. It represents a fast and frugal strategy to figure out well-
adapted kinds of behavior in a complex cultural setting by drawing on the frequency 
with which certain behaviors are shown by agents in this particular cultural context 
                                               
 
6 A cultural trait is defined as an idea, norm, belief, attitude, habit, or value that is 
acquired by social learning and that influences an individual's behavior (e.g., Bisin and 
Verdier, 2001; Henrich et al., 2008). Cultural traits have long been used in 
anthropology as units of transmission that reflect behavioral characteristics of 
individuals or groups (e.g., O'Brian et al., 2010). 
7 Reliance on cultural learning as well as the weighting of biases is itself tuned by both 
own experience and observation of others. Moreover, social learners may combine the 
learning heuristics described. 
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(e.g., Aronson et al., 2002; Kameda and Diasuke, 2002; Cialdini and Goldstein, 2004; 
Corriveau and Harris, 2010). Agents are, therefore, more likely to pick the behavioral 
variant that is modeled by the majority of group members, i.e., they discriminate 
against behaviors that are rare among peers. Conformity explains many aspects of 
group behavior including nonlinear behavioral changes in groups, such as threshold 
phenomena (e.g., Cordes et al., 2010). Self-similarity along dimensions such as sex, 
dialect, or ethnicity is another simple bias that allows to determine cultural contents 
worthwhile and safe being copied in complex cultural environments (e.g., Shutts et al., 
2009) and that lends itself to formalization. Both biases can, however, also lead to the 
adoption and spreading of maladaptive, “irrational” cultural traits (see below). 
Further important cultural learning biases that have been formalized in cultural 
evolution theory are the role model bias or prestige-based biases (e.g., Cordes et al., 
2008). Humans are prone to adopting behaviors exhibited by successful or prestigious 
individuals. For instance, seeking prestige drives much human behavior causing a 
certain number of prestigious role models to exist in every human group (see Henrich, 
2016, ch. 8). Evidence from psychology and anthropology shows that the adoption of 
cultural traits is frequently conditioned by observable attributes of individuals exhibiting 
the trait (e.g., Rogers, 1983; Harrington Jr., 1999; Labov, 2001; Henrich and Broesch, 
2011; Atkisson et al., 2012; Chudek et al., 2012).8 Suicide, to provide a very telling 
example, is role model and prestige biased: when celebrities commit suicide, there is a 
subsequent spike in suicide rates (e.g., Jonas, 1992).9 Moreover, the cultural 
transmission of suicide is also subject to self-similarity biases: individuals who kill 
themselves soon after celebrities tend to match their models on sex, age, and ethnicity. 
This demonstrates how potent our cultural learning abilities are: we can even acquire 
practices that natural selection would have eliminated under most conditions for they 
are not in our self-interest or that of our genes (also Henrich, 2016, ch. 4). 
Other biases active in cultural transmission and suited as potential ingredients 
to formal approaches to cultural evolution comprise payoff-based biases (e.g., Boyd 
and Richerson, 1985; Henrich, 2001; McElreath et al., 2008), biases arising from 
cultural dimensions acquired via socialization (see Chiao and Blizinsky, 2010; Cordes 
et al., 2017), or kinship-based biases (e.g., Henrich and Broesch, 2011). What is more, 
direct biases in cultural as well as individual learning make people preferentially adopt 
cultural traits based on their contents (e.g., Richerson and Boyd, 2005). Due to certain 
evolved cognitive predispositions that increase the inherent attractiveness of particular 
traits, directly-biased people learn some cultural traits rather than others. Examples are 
                                               
 
8 Role model bias may also depend on demonstrator performance, the number of 
demonstrators, or the consensus among demonstrators (see Morgan et al., 2012). 
9 In social-psychology, this phenomenon is called the “Werther effect”. 
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deeply-rooted preferences for prosocial behaviors such as cooperation or altruistic 
punishment (see Reuter et al., 2011; Fehr and Gächter, 2002), Veblen’s (1899) 
instinct-based concerns about status that translates into a preference for status-
signaling goods (also Ng’s (2003) “materialistic bias“ or Frank’s (2008) interest in 
“relative position“), or religious and “folkbiological” contents that spread easily due to 
“cognitive tracks” (see Sperber, 1990; Boyer, 1999; Henrich, 2016, ch. 5). 
4. What we gain: promising applications of naturalistic 
thinking and cultural evolution theory in economics 
This section presents some concrete existing applications of naturalistic thinking 
and cultural evolution theory to economic phenomena that all indicate the great 
explanatory potential of such a research agenda. 
4.1. Earlier naturalistic, Darwin-inspired approaches to economics 
First naturalistic, Darwin-inspired approaches to economics were the instinct- 
and habit-based theories of human agency delivered by American Institutionalism 
during the second half of the nineteenth century (e.g., Veblen, 1898, 1914; Clark, 
1918a, 1918b; Commons, 1920; Rutherford, 2000; Asso and Fiorito, 2004; Cordes, 
2015). These institutionalists enabled cross-fertilization between contemporary 
economics, evolutionary biology, and psychology. They argued that human behavior 
responds to two kinds of determinants: the basic drive of instinctive factors and the 
drive to conform to habits. Mitchell (1910), for instance, claimed human activities to be 
governed by instincts and habits as well as imitation and suggestibility. Humans’ 
intellectual apparatus then is the instrument by which instincts and habits seek their 
satisfaction. American Institutionalists understood human instincts as evolved, innate 
cognitive features that determine what agents perceive, pay attention to, experience as 
an emotional excitement, as well as the impulses to act on objects in a particular 
manner (e.g., McDougall, 1910). Thereby, many of these dispositions are functionally 
similar to the cognitive biases of modern cultural evolution theory. The formation and 
dissemination of habits, on the other hand, is influenced by instinctive proclivities as 
well as institutional settings and relies on sophisticated forms of evolved cultural 
learning capacities (e.g., Veblen, 1914, p. 7) – an early recognition of our species’ 
fundamental adaptation for culture. Moreover, the assumption of deeply-rooted 
motivations to stick to established habits is in line with effects attributed to norm 
psychology as a result of GCC. 
American Institutionalists suggested a great variety of instincts as results of 
human phylogeny (e.g., Veblen, 1914; Clark, 1918a; McDougall, 1920, 1924): the 
instincts of fear, repulsion, curiosity, anger, self-abasement, self-assertion, and 
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parental care as well as acquisitive, constructive instincts, such as the “instinct of 
workmanship”. Also some social, gregarious instincts, such as the “parental bent” that 
aims at the welfare of the family, clan, or group including non-relatives (!), belonged to 
this catalogue of cognitive traits. It therefore also comprised some prosocial behavioral 
features whose evolutionary origins are explained by modern GCC (see above). What 
is more, these institutionalists explicitly saw individual economic actors as operating 
within cultural contexts that, through the institutions they engender, strongly influence 
their behaviors (also Mazzoleni and Nelson, 2013). A modern naturalistic approach 
based on contemporary knowledge on humans’ cognitive dispositions as well as 
cultural evolution theory can substantiate many of American Institutionalists’ notions of 
instincts and habit transmission mechanisms, thereby operationalizing them for further 
analysis. This would avoid ad hoc justifications for any kind of human behavior simply 
by adding one new instinct or learning channel to an existing set, a criticism that has 
been frequently raised against this strand of economic research. 
Also F. A. Hayek – as a representative of the Austrian School – took a 
naturalistic stance on important issues by assuming a core set of human instincts that 
evolved in the “primitive tribal societies of prehistory” (Hayek, 1960, 1979; also 
Hodgson, 2007; Cordes, 2015). Following Hayek, innate behavioral dispositions can be 
assumed to have great influence on the evolution of institutions. He stated that frugal 
forms of social behavior, values, and attitudes became genetically fixed during human 
phylogeny. His conception of instincts starts from his notion of social rules: a 
stratification of rules of conduct rests on genetically inherited “instinctive” drives that 
are determined by “physiological structure”. This system of layered rules also includes 
– culturally transmitted – traditions of the past and a thin layer of deliberately added 
“made” rules. However, Hayek did not specify the exact contents of humans’ innate 
instincts and how their working keeps influencing institutional evolution. Instead, he just 
claimed that instincts are “tamed and checked” by the rules of conduct and institutions 
of civilized society. Moreover, Hayek shared a strong interest in theories of cultural 
evolution with Thorstein Veblen, a prominent representative of American 
Institutionalism. They both emphasized the unique human capability for cultural 
adaptations through cultural learning. In addition, they both paid extraordinary attention 
to group-regarding proclivities – phylogenetic outcomes of GCC. Furthermore, Hayek 
argued that an inherent part of human nature includes the welfare of others – an aspect 
of human empathy and pro-sociality (see above) – as a condition for individual 
happiness. Finally, he also embarked on the idea of a process of cultural group 
selection in institutional development favoring cooperative group cultures (Hayek, 
1988). 
Neo-Schumpeterians within the evolutionary economics camp draw on 
selectionist models analogous to phylogenetic biological evolution to scrutinize 
innovation dynamics and frequently combine these with aspects of cultural 
transmission. Nelson and Winter (1982), for example, reproduce the results of the 
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neoclassical (Solowian) growth model in a formal approach that includes competition 
via innovation and imitation based on observational learning. Metcalfe (1988, 1994) 
analyzes the diffusion of innovation in an economy with the help of a replicator dynamic 
that also includes cultural learning among consumers about product features as a form 
of selection (also Witt and Cordes, 2007). 
A naturalistically inspired theory of economic change that includes aspects of 
cultural evolution has also been brought forward by Douglass North (2005). His 
approach puts unique human cognition center stage: the driving forces of economic 
evolution are, he argued, human intentionality, beliefs, cognitive learning, and 
knowledge creation, including its subsequent dissemination via cultural learning 
mechanisms. Moreover, Denzau and North (1994) have provided a conceptual link 
between human cognition and the evolution of institutions: categories and mental 
models are based on individual and collective learning processes, i.e., evolved 
capabilities of social cognition contribute to the design and the cultural passing on of 
mental frameworks and finally corresponding societal institutions. 
4.2. Cultural transmission mechanisms and changing preferences 
As shown by more recent work, naturalistic insights and cultural evolution theory 
are especially well-suited to grasp the mechanisms underlying changes in human 
wants, i.e., to account for the empirical fact that our preferences are neither fixed nor 
homogenous (e.g., Elster, 1982; Sen, 1977; Bisin and Verdier, 2000; Schubert, 2012). 
Rather, agents permanently learn new ones or modify existing ones, thereby being 
subject to deep cultural influences (see Winter, 2014; Hoff and Stiglitz, 2016). This 
observation represents a central challenge for neoclassical theory that necessarily 
relies on given sets of stable preferences in utility maximization as fixed “measuring 
rods”. Economists have to come to terms with the fact that preferences are 
fundamentally shaped by cultural environments and that social interactions are, 
therefore, crucial determinants of economic outcomes. A naturalistic concept of wants 
presented by Ulrich Witt (2001, 2003) inspired by modern behavioral theory and 
cognitive psychology explains the origins and development of innate as well as learned 
wants people pursue (also Ruprecht, 2005; Lades, 2013; Chai, 2017). Starting from an 
individual’s set of innate wants this repertoire is extended by processes of non-
cognitive (via conditioning) and cognitive learning of acquired wants. In this context, 
cognitive learning forces include various cultural transmission mechanisms and biases 
as discussed above. Changing consumption patterns in the course of economic 
development and satiation phenomena that also impact on long-term economic growth 
rates can be fruitfully tackled by this approach.10 This concept explains aspects of 
                                               
 
10 Satiation phenomena are rarely accounted for in neoclassical approaches. 
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human consumption behavior that elude treatment by rational choice models 
comprising agents endowed with constant preferences. 
Moreover, Witt (2017) connects preferences over actions to the motivational 
forces driving actions, whereby the latter are entertained by naturalistic insights from 
biology, behavioral science, and psychology. Again, this enables the explanation of 
changing consumption patterns (e.g., with rising income) induced by systematically 
changing motivational forces underlying consumption acts. Witt argues that wants that 
are hard to satiate, such as status, social recognition, or positive self-image, account 
for a growing share in consumption in developed economies. Moreover, the continuous 
updating of wants due to cultural preference learning processes prevents certain forms 
of consumption motivation from ever vanishing (also Lades, 2013). This naturalistic 
theory of consumption also addresses normative and (adverse) welfare implications as 
to, for example, the call for continual consumption growth – prominent in traditional 
economics – in the face of difficult to satiate wants due to cultural learning dynamics 
(also Schubert and Cordes, 2013; Chai, 2017). In another contribution to this field, 
Woersdorfer (2010) shows how the demand for washing machines and other tools that 
meet the human want for cleanliness are strongly governed by culturally transmitted 
social norms prevalent in the agents’ environment. Norm psychology as a result of 
GCC enters the picture here. 
Also formal models of cultural evolution theory have been fruitfully applied in the 
field of endogenously changing preferences to fill this lacuna in economic theory. 
Schubert and Cordes (2013) present a model of population-based preference learning 
via cultural transmission: the continuous updating of individuals’ consumption 
preferences by processes of cultural learning biased by a sample of role models 
prevents them from reaching consumption levels that would satisfy a certain non-
changing preference level. As a consequence, agents permanently feel deprived and 
unsatisfied, a state that motivates them to permanently strive for ever higher levels of 
consumption. The authors argue that such a “run-away” preference learning process 
leads to welfare losses at the individual and societal level. Moreover, agents’ 
preferences lose their function as reliable “measuring rods” of economic outcomes. 
Again, based on a mathematical model of cultural evolution and applied to the field of 
ecological economics, Cordes and Schwesinger (2014) show how the cultural 
acquisition of “green preferences” by agents via conformist, role model, and also 
directly-biased individual, hedonistic learning can pave the ground for the diffusion of 
environmentally-benign technologies (also Buenstorf and Cordes, 2008; Pahl-Wostl et 
al., 2008; Welsch and Kühling, 2009). In this model, preference acquisition processes 
may even override relative cost disadvantages between competing technologies or 
consumption behaviors (also Røpke, 1999; Woersdorfer and Kaus, 2011). The 
combination of individual and cultural preference learning with more traditional 
economic considerations involving cost-based competition arrives at particular 
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recommendations as to environmental policy instruments promoting the diffusion of 
sustainable technologies (also Gowdy, 2008). 
4.3. Naturalistic approaches in organization theory 
Furthermore, naturalistic approaches that scrutinize the role of firms and other 
organizations in economic development have delivered a substantial body of research. 
They often explicitly include evolved cognitive dispositions of human agents and some 
are combined with formal tools from cultural evolution theory. Among other things, 
these avenues account for (changing) motivational underpinnings of human behavior 
within organizations, the evolution of firm cultures, firm performance, and 
organizational development (e.g., Boyd and Richerson, 1980; Witt, 1998, 2000; 
Langlois, 2003; Nicholson and White, 2006; Winter, 2014). For instance, based on a 
formal model of the evolution of a firm’s culture, Cordes et al. (2008; also Cordes et al., 
2011) show that what successful organizations do better than markets – besides 
economizing on transaction costs – is to establish a cooperative regime among its 
employees that ”crowds in” desirable behavior based on humans’ unique evolved 
group-regarding social predispositions (resulting from GCC).11 These behaviors go 
beyond the self-regarding, opportunistic concerns emphasized in the traditional theory 
of the firm. In these models, the agents’ acquisition of different behaviors including pro-
social ones is determined by learning biases, such as the role model bias, taking effect 
in cultural transmission within organizations. This naturalistic contribution to the theory 
of the firm also demonstrates how entrepreneurs and other business leaders can take 
advantage of the role model bias and actively shape behavior within a firm. As 
prominent, potentially prestigious role models in cultural learning they affect firm 
performance, culture, and growth – a cognitive and cultural evolutionary dimension 
neglected in both transaction cost economics and the theory of the firm more general 
(also, Langlois, 1998; Witt, 2007; Witt and Schwesinger, 2013). 
Based on anthropological, social-psychological, and economic evidence on the 
effects of increasing group size on group performance, Cordes et al. (2014) scrutinize 
the role of evolving firm cultures in triggering spinoffs via growth crises in firm 
development due to behavioral changes in growing groups. Within the proposed model 
of cultural evolution, the – often rather sudden – occurrence of organizational growth 
crises is crucially influenced by conformist transmission among culturally interacting 
members of an organization. In small firms, it may initially stabilize a cooperative 
corporate culture based on humans’ prosociality that is especially successful in 
dynamic, nascent business environments. Later, conformism can spur the 
                                               
 
11 For industry-level effects of evolving firm cultures and corresponding organizational 
performance see Cordes et al. (2010). 
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dissemination of opportunistic behavior once its frequency has surpassed a critical 
threshold in the course of success-driven increases in firm size and corresponding 
changes in group culture and employees’ behaviors. Growth crisis than cause the 
exodus of personnel – well-trained in the previously cooperative firm culture – founding 
own firms and affecting a whole industry’s or region’s economic performance (see, 
Christensen, 1993; Buenstorf and Fornahl, 2009). Cordes et al. (2015) present a model 
that again features a critical organizational size triggering growth crises. Together with 
other processes, such as firm exit and entry, systematically appearing growth crises at 
the firm level produce several empirically well-established (right-skewed) shapes of firm 
size distributions (including power law and lognormal distributions). In both 
approaches, aspects of our group-bound psychology, which evolved via GCC in our 
past and which affect current processes of organizational development, are related to 
economic phenomena at the firm and industry level. 
Cultural learning is also underlying group-bound socialization processes. 
Drawing on an approach introduced to cultural evolution theory by Feldman and 
Cavalli-Sforza (1975), Cordes et al. (2017; also Lundan et al., 2017) suggest a 
Markovian model of cultural evolution that depicts the development of cultural distance 
within and between groups or organizational units by capturing the socialization 
dynamics taking place within these entities. This is done with the help of cultural 
transmission matrices. The approach facilitates to assess alternative organizational 
governance structures in terms of the socialization processes they enable that entail 
different intraorganizational transaction costs due to cultural distance within or between 
units. Characteristics that define an organization's socialization governance structure 
include shared or divided social experiences in (sub-) groups, the assignment and 
influence of role models, group sizes, the cultural background of employees, specific 
cultural dimensions, such as collectivism and individualism, and the implementation of 
certain cultures in business units. Thus, the authors argue, organizations have the 
capacity to capture transactional benefits arising from the governance of socialization 
experiences as a feature of cultural evolution. 
4.4. Further cultural forces as determinants of economic outcomes 
Cultural forces are important determinants of many economic outcomes that are 
not explicable by rational choice theory in a convincing – non-tautological – way: a 
sense of collective identity fostering altruistic acts toward an organization’s members 
(e.g., McElreath et al., 2003; Cordes et al., 2008), a culture of honor that causes agents 
to behave in ways preventing mutually beneficial conventions from emerging in social 
interactions (e.g., Richerson and Boyd, 2005, ch. 5; Vance, 2017), priming a certain 
cultural context before (economic) decision-making (e.g., Hoff and Stiglitz, 2016), or 
engaging in transactional relationships based on culturally established trust regimes 
(e.g., Nooteboom, 1996). Beaman et al. (2012) provide empirical field evidence for a 
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very significant role model effect in cultural transmission: if women are enabled by law 
to take respected roles or leadership positions in local populations, villagers in India 
start to appreciate higher educational attainments for females, thereby strongly 
affecting their later economic status. Similarly, La Ferrara et al. (2012) show how 
exposure to soap operas in which women had few children reduced fertility rates in 
Brazil. Cultural dimensions, such as individualism and collectivism as results of 
socialization based on cultural transmission mechanisms, even explain long-run 
economic growth paths of nations: more individualist cultures generate more 
innovation, higher productivity, and higher growth rates than countries with a more 
collectivist culture (see Gorodnichenko and Roland, 2011). Moreover, analyses of 
differential institutional performance have been based upon cultural dimensions of this 
kind (e.g., Greif, 1994). 
Chiao and Blizinsky (2010) show how affection-based direct biases in attention 
and cognition that result from GCC (see above) influence the transmission of cultural 
values of individualism and collectivism: carriers of a certain allele are more likely to 
engage in narrow thinking, perceive negative information, and consider dependency, 
whereas carriers of another allele of the same gene show greater willingness to take 
risks, self-express, and pay attention to positive information. Biases in cultural learning 
also emanate from socialization: Kitayama and Park (2010) provide evidence form 
neuroscience showing that people in Western cultures keep their personal self highly 
accessible in reasoning and place greater value on it, which gives rise to attention 
biases as to individual goals and desires as well as socially disengaging emotions. On 
the other hand, Eastern cultures bias attention toward aspects of interdependency, 
holism, and social goals and socially engaging emotions. Mesoudi et al. (2014) 
demonstrate how agents in Western populations – as opposed to members of Eastern 
cultures – under-utilize social information in lab experiments due to a too strong 
reliance on asocial learning, which happens because of cultural biases toward 
individualism. Moreover, the authors found higher copying frequencies in females than 
male participants. It is culture in combination with evolved or learned cognitive 
dispositions that explain these important differences in agents’ perceiving, learning, 
and acting. Of course, they are also relevant in economic decision-making. Again, 
these cognitive and cultural forces effective in human reasoning do not automatically 
lead to “optimal” behaviors. 
4.5. The spreading of maladaptive cultural traits 
Consequently, while the evolved human capacity for culture surely was of great 
adaptive value in reproduction and survival of our species, this does not imply that 
cultural transmission always promotes the diffusion of well-adapted, welfare-enhancing 
cultural traits or rational, utility-maximizing behaviors in the sense of the Homo 
economicus model prominent among economists. Rather, the channels of cultural 
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transmission may be hijacked by pretty maladaptive ideas and strategies that do not 
necessarily serve an individual’s (objective) interests. Conformity bias and norm 
psychology, for example, can sometimes foster the spreading or stabilization of cultural 
variants in groups that do not contribute to overall welfare of its members. Humans’ 
strong reliance on cultural information as a means of ecological adaptation, therefore, 
also facilitates the spreading of behaviors that appear “strange” in the eye of a 
scientific, external observer (see Brown and Richerson, 2014). This holds especially 
true in modern societies where selection pressures are weak at most. Mass media, for 
example, exposes us to many influential, prestigious role models whose behaviors are 
not suited to increase our personal wellbeing – a situation in which a role model bias in 
our psychology makes us susceptible to maladaptive cultural contents. 
In fact, there is a large anthropological literature describing how maladaptive 
cultural contents can spread to the disadvantage of actors (for references see 
Richerson and Boyd, 2005; Henrich et al., 2008): for instance, Diamond (2005) 
describes how the Norse failed to survive in Greenland because of sticking to 
maladaptive cultural traits, such as pastoralism, cattle raising, and food taboos (no 
fish!). Moreover, due to issues of cultural distance, the Norse refused to learn from Inuit 
how to use abundant food resources available in that habitat. Agents, Diamond argues, 
have been socialized in certain cultures and this prevented them from considering any 
– potentially rational – solution to Greenland’s problems. Modern demographic 
transition, to provide another example, can partly be attributed to the sharp increase in 
the ratio of non-kin to kin in social networks, leading to the dissemination of fertility-
limiting cultural information between unrelated peers (see Newson et al., 2007). This is 
maladaptive from the perspective of the selfish, fitness maximizing gene and seems to 
be at odds with a rational choice process as to the number of children an individual 
should bring up in order to maximize utility. Obviously, humans frequently miss rational 
predictions due to their unique and powerful adaptation for culture. 
5. Conclusions 
Culture is not a variable upon which economists have traditionally focused. This 
is a severe scientific shortcoming since culture and its transmission are the defining 
features of Homo sapiens: we strongly depend on culturally transmitted information. 
Humans are uniquely adapted for culture, a capacity that rendered us an ecologically 
very successful species. It is collective culture based on evolved special skills of social-
cultural cognition that supports complex forms of human collaboration, such as tool-use 
and hunting (remember the Inuits!) as well as modern technology, consumption 
behaviors, organizations, and institutions. As cultural beings, humans are not just 
social, but “ultra-social” (see Herrmann et al., 2007). Moreover, when accepting the 
outstanding role of culture in human evolution, we must also pay attention to 
subsequent processes of gene-culture coevolution (GCC) and their cognitive and finally 
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behavioral results. Cultural evolution has been a primary driver of humans’ genetic 
evolution. Many uniquely human cognitive, affective, and moral capacities, such as 
other-regarding concerns including cooperation, identification, group membership, and 
fairness, as well as various cultural learning mechanisms, originated from the 
evolutionary dynamics of GCC. These dispositions go far beyond the self-regarding 
concerns of agents focused upon in mainstream economics. 
While, cultural systems are capable of innovative adaptive response to changes 
in conditions and are often smart and ecologically highly successful, they are not 
approaching something like optimality. In real-world settings, optimal behavior is mostly 
impossible. Instead, limits to our cognitive resources in the face of a – especially 
interactionally – complex world induce individuals to adopt culturally transmitted 
behaviors using simple heuristics and other learning mechanisms. Therefore, cultural 
learning strategies that are studied by cultural evolutionists can – and often do – lead to 
the acquisition of maladaptive information. Thus, these potent cultural systems are not 
based on rational decision-making but rely on the unique human capacity of learning-
based cumulative cultural evolution. Furthermore, as culture is continuously and 
actively evolving in historical time, the assumption that a population of economic 
agents is always (or ever) at an optimal equilibrium along this trajectory is implausible. 
Given the strong human dependency upon cultural transmission, economists – 
as social scientists – have to do justice to the fact that also the bulk of agents’ 
behavioral repertoires, choice sets, utility functions, and preferences are set up and 
changed via cultural learning forces. Their perception, cognition, and, finally, decision-
making are heavily affected by their (varying) cultural environments and do not 
necessarily meet the requirements of rational choice. Hence, taking serious our 
anthropological knowledge about human phylogeny, we see that it was not Homo 
economicus that resulted from this evolutionary process. Rather, an agent has evolved 
that heavily relies upon information in her cultural environment plus individual learning, 
deliberation, and creativity that “fuel” cumulative cultural evolution. This should have 
profound implications for any behavioral model used in economics since any 
explanation of human economic behavior that fails to take cultural evolutionary 
processes into account will provide only an incomplete understanding. Consequently, 
the naturalistic approach to human behavior suggested in this article does not draw on 
full blown optimization as the all-embracing benchmark of economic theorizing. Rather, 
it takes the nature of human actors as it is described by the sciences as the origin of 
theory development and inspiration for new directions in empirical work. Cultural 
evolution theory including naturalistic insights may, therefore, also serve as a synthetic 
concept for the behavioral sciences (also Gintis, 2007). 
As shown, a naturalistic approach to economics that does justice to the fact that 
human beings are evolved as a highly cultural species can explain real-world economic 
phenomena as a dimension of cultural evolution based on and influenced as well as 
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constrained by humans’ evolved cognitive capacities. We have presented existing 
fruitful applications of naturalistic thinking – partly combined with formal models of 
cultural evolution – in the fields of changing preferences, consumption behavior, theory 
of the firm, and industrial dynamics, among others. In this context, it is important to 
note that the behavioral model based on a naturalistic avenue does not represent yet 
another deviation from the standard rational choice model as is often the case with 
contributions to bounded rationality. For instance, experiments in behavioral economics 
are predominantly motivated by identifying contexts in which quasi-rational individual 
actors systematically exhibit seemingly inconsistent, faulty choices due to agents’ 
limited cognitive abilities (a.k.a. the “neoclassical repair project”). However, violations of 
the rational actor model, which may also be subsumed under the so-called “anomalies” 
of behavioral economics, such as following “wrong” role models, “bad” norms, 
“irrelevant” cultural frames, “maladaptive” habits, or “badly informed” majorities, seem 
to constitute the very core of humans’ unique cultural capacities. Therefore, naturalistic 
and cultural evolutionary approaches look at these powerful cultural transmission 
mechanisms that make up essential parts of human cognition and then elaborate on 
their deep behavioral and finally economic implications. Ignoring these cultural skills 
and the cultural contexts of individuals blinds economic analysis to important influences 
and phenomena in which it should be interested. 
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